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LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES' RATIFICATION OF
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
JAY ROSENTHAL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 11, 1948, the United States officially signed the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Convention).1 The Convention was
sent to the Senate as part of the ratification process for the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. 2 But the Senate
declined to give advice and consent to the Convention, and has maintained that position for over thirty-six years. Ninety-six countries have
now deposited their instruments of ratification with the United Nations,
making them parties to the Convention. The United States is not a party.
Opponents to ratification have consistently argued that the Convention is unconstitutional and that the Senate should not give its advice and
consent. 3 Proponents of ratification, however, have refuted, point-bypoint, the constitutional objections raised by the Convention's oppo* J.D., 1984, Antioch School of Law; M.A. 1981, School of International Service, The American University; B.A., 1979, The American University.
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
openedfor signature Dec. 9, 1948, came intoforce Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprintedin Louis
SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1973), 69-71. For a commentary on the Convention see N. ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, Institute of Jewish Affairs (1960); PIETER DROST, GENOCIDE, UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATION ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1959). For a general
bibliography on genocide and other crimes against humanity see Y. VAN GARSSE, A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND WAR CRIMES (1970). (For purposes of this
article, the terms "Treaty" and "Convention" are used interchangeably.)
2 U.S. CONST. Art. II § 2. If the Senate were to give its advice and consent to the Convention,
the President would then ratify the Treaty. Enabling legislation, enacted by both Houses of Congress, would follow and eventually the United States' Instrument of Ratification would be deposited
with the United Nations. The United States would then be legally bound, both domestically and
internationally, to abide by the precepts of the Treaty.
3 See Finch, The Genocide Convention, 43 A.J.I.L. 732 (1949); Phillips & Deutsch, Pitfalls of
the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A.J. 641 (1970); Raymond, Genocide: An UnconstitutionalHuman
Rights Convention?, 12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 294 (1972); White, Tomorrow One May be Guilty of
Genocide, 12 TEX. B.J. 203 (1949); Genocide Convention Ratification: Hearings on Executive 0.,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Before the Special
Subcommittee on the Genocide Convention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 193-223 (May 22, 1970) (testimony of Senator Sam Erwin) (hereinafter cited as
GENOCIDE HEARINGS). Senator Erwin is perhaps the most celebrated constitutional expert
testifying against the Convention.
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nents. 4 This effort, however, has had no effect on the Senate. The purpose of this article is to show that the constitutional arguments raised by
the Convention's opponents are specious and, to an extent, self-serving.
The arguments raised by the Convention's opponents do not resolve constitutional questions, but rather tend to promote an anti-globalist philosophy. They are, in fact, worried about the extent to which the United
States is willing to take part in an integrating process toward a unified
global legal system. They are opposed in principle to any treaty which
might lead to a unified world government under the aegis of an international judicial body. The Convention's effects are viewed as promoting
that end. Some of the Convention's opponents are also troubled by the
apparent ineffectiveness of the Convention's enforcement mechanisms
and the ongoing geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union, another
party to the Convention. In essence, this globalist 5/anti-globalist 6 conflict, in all its various manifestations, is the main impediment to
ratification.
This Comment begins with a short history of the Genocide Convention, which will provide a reference for examining the subsequent constitutional arguments for and against ratification. The second part of the
article analyzes the main constitutional arguments and counterarguments raised by the Convention's opponents and proponents, respectively. The weakness of the constitutional argument against ratification
will be of particular concern. The last section of the article introduces a
revisionist theory defining the three main doctrinal rationales embraced,
4 See Goldberg & Gardner, Time to Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A.J. 141 (1972);
McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950);
Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and States Rights, 43 A.J.I.L. 498 (1949); Note, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142 (1949); Note, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683 (1975); Perlman, The Genocide Convention, 30 NEB. L.

REV. 1 (1950). See also Senator Jacob Javits' Point-by-Point Rebuttal of Senator Erwin's testimony,
GENOCIDE HEARINGS, id. at 219-223.
5 Globalism is a rapidly developing belief in the importance of creating a world legal system
capable of dealing with international problems too complex and interdependent to be addressed on a
national level. Generally, the areas of greatest concern are international resource management, nuclear proliferation, international human rights abuses, and East-West nuclear confrontation. For an
introduction to the concept of globalism see generally I. CLAUDE JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 205-285 (1962); E. HASS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE (1964); RICHARD FALK,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (1981); RICHARD FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE
WORLDS (1975); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, TOWARDS A GLOBAL FEDERALISM (1968); H. LASSWEL
& L. CHU-CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); ON THE CREATION OF A
JUST WORLD ORDER (S. MEDLOVITZ ED. 1975); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); G. CLARK & L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (3RD ED.
1966); WALLACE MCCLURE, WORLD LEGAL ORDER (1960); MOSES MOSKoWITz, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD ORDER (1958).
6 For a theoretical argument against the concept of globalism see HANS MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 500-516 (5th ed. 1973).
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either in whole or in part, by the Convention's opponents: anti-globalism, anti-Sovietism, and neo-positivism. In conclusion, it will be shown
that the Senate's fear of promoting globalism, rather than the fear of
violating constitutional norms, continues to be the main motivation behind opposition to ratification of the Convention.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
Prior to the Nazi ascension to power in Europe, genocide was only
considered an unfortunate result of uncontrollable social and political
forces. 7 The uniqueness of the European phenomenon was that the Nazis overall genocidal policy relied very little on anarchistic tendencies.
The program of racial genocide, as implemented by the Nazis, was based
on scientific principles calculated to bring about a permanent change in
the European balance of power. The Nazis hoped to restructure Europe
through the organized extermination of certain peoples. Eventually,
Germany would control Europe, and the world, through the terror
caused by the systematic murder of the Fatherland's opponents.
Raphael Lemkin, a European jurist who was outraged by Nazi
atrocities in World War II, realized that there was a need for definition
and clarity concerning this new crime of genocide. He felt this a necessary step if atrocities such as those perpetrated by the Nazis were ever to
be outlawed from the face of the earth. Lemkin describes the necessity of
this new definition:
The realities of European life in the years 1933-1945 called for the
creation of such a term and for the formulation of a legal concept
of destruction of human groups. The Nazis had embarked upon a
gigantic plan to change permanently the population balance in occupied Europe in their favor. They intended to wipe out entirely
the national-biological power of the neighbors of Germany so that
Germany might win a permanent victory, whether directly
through military subjugation or indirectly through such a biological destruction that even in the case of Germany's defeat the
neighbors would be so weakened that Germany would be able to
recover her strength in later years. 8
Many Armenians would disagree with this characterization. The Armenian people have consistently accused Turkey of waging an intentional, well-planned genocidal campaign against the
Armenians in 1915. It is estimated that about 1.5 million Armenians died in this holocaust. See
generally DICKRAN BOYAJIAN, ARMENIA: THE CASE FOR A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE (1972); ARNOLD TOYNBEE, ARMENIAN ATROCITIES: THE MURDER OF A NATION (1915); SHAVARGH
TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973). For a history of genocide, see LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE (1982); IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, GENOCIDE, STATE POWER
AND MASS MURDER (1977). Both of these books deal primarily with genocide in the modern era,
but also provide a historical overview of genocide throughout the ages.
8 Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under InternationalLaw, 41 A.J.I.L. 145, 147 (1947). See also
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In 1933, Lemkin submitted a proposal to the International Conference for Unification of Criminal Law in Madrid, Spain, advocating the
addition of two new international crimes under the law of nations: barbarity, consisting of the extermination of racial, religious, or social collectives, and vandalism, consisting in the destruction of cultural and
artistic works of these groups. 9 The Conference, however, declined to
adopt the proposal. In hindsight, Sir Hartley Shawcross, United Kingdom Attorney General and delegate to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, speculated that if Lemkin's proposal had been accepted,
the Nuremberg Tribunal might have been able to indict the Nazis for
serious crimes against humanity perpetrated before 1939. The Nuremberg Tribunal, though, limited the indictments to actions taken after the
start of German hostilities against Poland. Hence, certain crimes against
humanity were linked, by necessity, to war crimes.10
In 1946, at a United Nations General Assembly meeting, Lemkin
again proposed the drafting of international criminal legislation outlawing genocide. As a result, a resolution establishing genocide as an international crime and calling for international legislation was placed on the
agenda of the General Assembly. On December 11, 1946, the General
Assembly adopted the resolution," which requested the Economic and
Social Council to draw up a draft convention on the crime of genocide.
The draft convention would be formally introduced at the next regular
2
session of the General Assembly.'
In 1948, the draft convention outlawing the crime of genocide was
adopted by resolution of the General Assembly in plenary session. The
vote was 56 to 0.13 The Genocide Convention was signed by twenty nations in Paris on December 9, 1948, and put into force on January 12,
1951.14 The United States officially signed the treaty on December 11,
1948, but the Senate has yet to give advice and consent to the
Convention. 5
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, Washington Carnegie Endownment for In-

ternational Peace (1944).
9 Id. at 146.
10 Id. at 146. Sir Hartley Shawcross was, nevertheless, a publicly announced opponent of the
Genocide Convention. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 46. See generally Judgement of the International Military Tribunal, 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Proceedings 411 (1948), reprinted in 41 A.J.I.L. 172 (1947).
11 G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/231, at 3 (1946).
12 Lemkin, supra note 8, at 150. See also VITA BITE, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (1980). For an excellent summary of the legal
and political controversies surrounding the drafting of the Convention see, Drost, supra note 1, at
60-63.
13 G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/760, at 9 (1948).
14 Finch, supra note 3, at 732.
15 Bite, supra note 12, at 1.
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The Convention 16 states that genocide is a crime under international
law whether committed in time of war or peace. 17 Genocide is defined in
the treaty as:
. . . any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in

whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups
1. killing members of the group;
2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
3. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
8
5. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.'
Conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide are also
crimes under the Treaty.1 9 The Convention further stipulates that persons committing genocide "shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals. ' 20 In
addition, each "contracting party shall enact legislation in accordance
with their respective constitutions" which provides for "effective penalties."121 Trials may be brought under jurisdiction of the state, or any "International Tribunal as may have jurisdiction over the contracting
parties."' 22 The International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) may hear
disputes between the contracting parties as to "interpretation, applica'23
tion, or fulfillment" at the "request of any of the parties to the dispute.
The Convention also provides that genocide and the other acts "shall not
be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition." 24 These
basic provisions are set forth in the Convention, which has now been
25
ratified by ninety-six countries.
A primary reason for the initial congressional hostility to the Con16 Genocide Convention, supra note I. The votes and discussion of the United Nations General
Assembly are found in U.N. Doc. A/PV 178 (Dec. 9, 1948). The Convention will hereinafter be
cited by article only ("Art.").
17 Art. I of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
18 Art. II of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
19 Art. III of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
20 Art. IV of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
21 Art. V of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
22 Art. VI of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
23 Art. IX of the Genocide Convention, see appendix. Several countries have included reservations nullifying the jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article IX. Most notable are the U.S.S.R., India,
Spain, Venezuela, Argentina, Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, Hungary, Mongolia, and Romania. Note,
The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683, 685 n.5 (1975).
24 Art. VII of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
25 Bite, supra note 12, at 1. This group includes Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Federal Re-
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vention was the opposition of the American Bar Association (hereinafter
ABA). At the seventy-second annual meeting of the ABA in St. Louis,
Missouri, from September 5 thru 9, 1949, the ABA's Special Committee
on Peace and Law Through the United Nations, 26 and the ABA's Section on International and Comparative Law 27 both recommended to the
ABA's House of Delegates that the Senate should reject the Convention
as proposed. Consequently, the ABA's House of Delegates voted to rec28
ommend that the Senate decline advice and consent to the Convention.
The Section on International and Comparative Law also submitted a report which contained recommendations for curing some defects in the
Treaty. The House of Delegates debated the recommendations, but no
consensus was reached. As a result, the reports and recommendations
were sent to Congress without reaching agreement on which approach to
29
take in re-drafting the Convention.
The reaction of Congress was ambivalent. A Special Subcommittee
on the Genocide Convention was formed to conduct open hearings on
the ratification question. Hearings were held on January 23, 24, and 25,
and February 9, 1950. Proponents and opponents of the Convention debated publicly for the first time at these hearings. Those recommending
ratification were represented by Dean Rusk, then Deputy Under Secretary of State; and Philip Perlman, Solicitor General of the United States.
The opponents were represented by spokesmen from the ABA: Alfred
Schweppe, the Chairman of the ABA's Special Committee on Peace and
Law Through the United Nations; and George Finch, Editor-in-Chief of
the American Journal of International Law.30 The subcommittee rejected the arguments put forth by the ABA and proposed ratification by
the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with no reservations attached.3 1 The Committee, however, refused to act. Some observers atpublic of Germany, France, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.S.S.R., Saudi Arabia,

and the United Kingdom.
26 ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Report of the Special Committee on Peace and Law Through
the United Nations (1949).
27 ABA, SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, Report and Recommenda-

tions on the Human Rights Covenant and the Genocide Convention to the House of Delegates of the
ABA and Resolution adopted by the House of Delegates (1949).

29 Finch, supra note 3, at 732.
29 Id. at 732-33.
30 See generally Genocide Convention Ratification:

Hearings on Executive 0., the Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Before the Special Subcommittee on
the Genocide Convention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.

(1950).
31 When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally recommended ratification of the treaty
in 1971, it attached three understandings and one declaration in its report. The three understandings
and one declaration proposed by the Senate Committee are:
1.

That the U.S. Government understands and construes the words "intent to destroy, in
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tributed this inaction to the combination of overt ABA opposition and
the covert influence of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and other anti-globalist Senators who opposed ratification because they believed that the Convention's apparent effect would undermine United States sovereignty. 32
This congressional stalemate postponed serious debate of the Convention for over twenty years. But in the early 1970's the issue
reemerged when President Nixon requested the Senate "to renew consideration of the Convention. ' 33 Hearings were held in 1970, 34 1971, 35 and
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group," as such appearing in Article II, to
mean the intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group by the acts specified in
Article II in such manner as to affect a substantial part of the group concerned.
2. That the U.S. Government understands and construes the words "mental harm" appearing
in Article II(b) of this Convention to mean permanent impairment of mental faculties.
3. That the U.S. Government understands and construes Article VI of the Convention in
accordance with the agreed language of the Legal Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that nothing in Article VI shall affect the right of any state to bring to trial before its own
tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the state.
4. The U.S. Government declares that it will not deposit its instrument of ratification until
after the implementing legislation referred to in Article V has been enacted.
The nature and effect of the three understandings and one declaration on U.S. ratification of the
Genocide Convention is yet an unanswered question. One commentator offers three possible
scenarios:
(1) The duties and rights of the United States will be based on customary international law-either because the United States fails to ratify the Convention, or because it
purports to ratify the Convention with statements determined to be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention, thereby nullifying the supposed ratification.
(2) The duties and rights of the United States will be determined under the Genocide
Convention. This result may occur either by United States ratification without reservations or understandings, or with statements short of reservations (interpretations, declarations or understandings) which are accepted by the ICJ or by other parties to the
Convention as being appropriate or correct.
(3) The United States' obligations and rights under the Convention will be modified
by reservations which are objected to by some parties to the Convention but which are
nonetheless held by the ICJ to be compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and therefore permissible. The result would be a situation in which some contracting parties would, and others would not, consider themselves to be in treaty
relations with the United States.
Note, supra note 23, at 684-685 n.5.
In 1950, the General Assembly asked the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on certain questions
concerning the effect of reservations and objections to reservation on the Convention. The ICJ released its opinion on May 20, 1951. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention,
1951 I.C.J. 15. For an analysis of the Court's findings see United Nations Action in the Field of
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR12/Rev. 1, at 296. See also Koh, Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties: How InternationalLegal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 71 (1982)
for an analysis of the evolution of the law of reservations in the 20th century, focusing on the legal
and political problems inherent in the globalist/anti-globalist (absolute state autonomy) debate.
For a general analysis of the Senate's role in the ratification process and the effect of reservations and declarations on the binding effect of treaties, see Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty
Ratification, 77 A.J.I.L. 257 (1983).
32 Bite, supra note 12, at 2.
33 Id. at 3.
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General debate was held on the Senate floor for the first time in
1974, 37 and Executive Reports were released in 1971,38 1973, 39 and
1976. 40 Yet, Senate approval was denied, even though on February 17,
1976, the ABA's House of Delegates reversed its previous position and
voted to endorse ratification of the Convention. 41 Further, in 1977, after
only a few months in office, President Carter pledged his full support.
42
He then sent the Convention to the Senate for advice and consent.
Nevertheless, the Senate refused to act, and the Convention remains
unratified.
1977.36

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

A.

Introduction

Opponents to ratification of the Convention argue that genocide is
an internal domestic crime, rather than an international crime. Once
viewed as an internal domestic crime, ratification of the Convention
would be an abuse of the treaty-making power established in the Constitution, 4 3 which specifically states that the President "shall have power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties." 44 In
Geofrey v. Riggs the Supreme Court held that the treaty-making power
may be invoked only on matters which are "properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." ' 45 Generally, domestic problems are not
considered proper subjects for international negotiation. Opponents to
the Convention conclude that acts of genocide should be of no concern to
the international legal community, nor are they a basis for invoking the
34 Genocide Convention Ratification: Hearings on Executive 0., the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Before the Special Subcommittee on the Genocide
Convention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (April 24, 27 & May
22, 1970).
35 Genocide Convention Ratification: Hearings on Executive 0., the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Before the Special Subcommittee on the Genocide
Convention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (May 10, 1971).
36Genocide Convention Ratification: Hearings on Executive 0., the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Before the full Committee on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 24 & 26, 1977).
37 120 Cong. Rec. S1833-1839, 1843-1845, 2176-2187, 2202-2209, 2334-2339 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1974).
38
39
40
41
42

S. Exec. Rep. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
S. Exec. Rep. No. 93-5, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
S. Exec. Rep. No. 94-23, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976).
Bite, supra note 12, at 6.
President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 397, 401 (Nov.
17, 1977).
43 Raymond, supra note 3, at 299-302; Phillips and Deutsch, supra note 3, at 642.

44 U.S. CONST. Art. II s 2.
45 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrruTION 140-42 (1972).
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treaty-making power. Some opponents to ratification emphasize this
point by portraying the Convention as an unjustified intervention into the
internal affairs of other nations. They assert that genocide will never
occur in the United States. Consequently, even signing the Convention
46
would be a worthless endeavor.
Opponents to ratification also contend that if a Treaty does not address international issues and it is a self-executing instrument, the effect
would be domestic criminal legislation enacted by an international body
with only Senate approval. Hence, the rights of States to enact and enforce criminal legislation would be subverted, 47 as would the constitutional requirement that both Houses of Congress enact the laws of the
48
United States.
This constitutional argument, however, is specious. It is presented
more as an ideological argument against global cooperation and integration than as an expression of a legitimate constitutional concern. Accordingly, an analysis of the constitutional argument against ratification
is in order.
B. Genocide Under the Treaty-Making Clause
The framers of the Constitution never intended to limit the circumstances surrounding the capacity of the federal government to conduct
international relations under the treaty-making clause. 49 To the contrary, the founding fathers felt that there would be new conflicts and
problems arising out of a changing world that would require the executive to enter into innovative international agreements. 50 This was expressed most clearly by James Madison:
The objects of treaties is the.regulation of intercourse with foreign
nations, and is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all
the cases in which such external regulations would be necessary.
Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress could
exercise authority? The definition might and probably would be
defective. They might be restrained by such a definition from exercising the authority where 5it1 could be essential to the interest
and safety of the community.
46 Raymond, supra note 3, at 299.
47 U.S. CONST., Amendment X; See generally McDougal and Arens, The Genocide Convention

and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683, 690-91 (1950).
48 U.S. CONST., ART. I § 8.
49 U.S. CONST., ART. II

§

2.

For a thorough discussion of these new international problems, see McDougal & Leighton,
The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusion versus Rational Action, 59
YALE L.J. 60, 90 (1949).
51 3 Elliott's Debates 514-515 (2d Ed. 1836).
50
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Alexander Hamilton, although not an advocate for a free executive hand
in the treaty-making process, nevertheless indicated that "A treaty cannot be made which alters the Constitution of the country, or which infringes any express exceptions to the power of the Constitution of the
United States. But it is difficult to assign any other bounds to the
52
power."
Over the last 200 years, the modem-day nation states of the world
have become increasingly interdependent. As such, the economic and
political interests of the United States, as inferred in its treaty-making
powers,5 3 have broadened to keep pace with an evolving international
system. This ever changing global system has necessitated an expansion
of the executive power to allow the President to bind the United States to
precedent setting international agreements. Significantly, the Supreme
Court has never invalidated a treaty on the ground that the Executive
54
exceeded its authority under the treaty-making clause.
The characterization of the Convention as being unconstitutional
because it establishes individual criminal liability on a transnational
scale, is a prime example of the shallowness of the anti-ratification argument. The United States is a party to numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties. A number of these agreements, in particular those dealing
with piracy, 55 slavery 56 and narcotics, 57 establish individual criminal liability as does the Genocide Convention. 58 It is unrealistic to characterize
these older treaties as dealing with valid international concerns, while
characterizing the Genocide Convention as dealing with a domestic issue
unworthy of international concern. Genocide is a problem which affects
52 Id., Vol. II, at 123. For a summary of opposing positions on this point among the founding
fathers, see PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNOWS 14 (1977).

53 U.S. CONST. Art. II § 2.
54 Louis SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

at 921 (1973). One of the principle defects in the original Articles of Confederation was the central
government's inability to define and punish infractions against the law of nations. The inclusion of
the treaty-making power in our constitution was intended to remedy this defect. See Dickenson, The
Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 34-41. See
also Henkin, supra note 45, at 129.
55 See generally HARVARD SCHOOL OF LAW, HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,

PIRACY (1932), at 739-1013.
56See, e.g., Treaty of 1862, Suppression of African Slave Trade, April 7, 1862, United StatesBritain, 12 Stat. 1225; T.S. No. 126; reprinted in 8 Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States of America 753 (Miller, 1948); Slavery Convention signed Sept. 25, 1926, entered into
force March 9, 1927, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778.

57 See, e.g., 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863.
58 Art. IV of the Genocide Convention, see appendix. For an example of a foreign judicial

decision applying the concept of individual liability, see Attorney-General of the Government of Israel
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); See also Henkin, supra note 45, at 155 for an argument that human
rights has been a major focus of numerous international agreements.
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the whole society of nations, whether as a result of persistent refugee
problems, which almost always accompany genocidal acts, or as a result
of rising international or regional tensions which are attendant to genocidal acts. Dean Rusk expressed these sentiments when he testified before
the Senate Subcommittee on the Question of Genocide:
When large numbers of refugees are created through the crime of
genocide, which challenges the conscience of all of us and requires
us to provide means for taking care of it, and when crimes like
genocide so inflame the international situation as to bring us to the
brink of war and are real threats to the peace, the impact on not
very great, so
only our foreign policy but our domestic interest is 59
long as such things as genocide occur in the world.
A recent example of this phenomenon occurred in Southeast Asia
after the Cambodian revolution in 1978. Pol Pot's genocidal acts committed against the people of Cambodia caused a massive exodus of refugees into neighboring countries. These refugees presented a problem for
many Southeast Asian countries, in particular Thailand and Vietnam. In
1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, using Pol Pot's crimes against humanity as the primary excuse. This action brought into conflict the Chinese-backed forces of Pol Pot against the Soviet-backed forces of
Vietnam. The invasion also occurred only a short time after a limited
Sino-Vietnamese border war. Ultimately, Southeast Asia, and to an extent the rest of the world, became more unstable and dangerous due to
the genocidal acts perpetrated by Pol Pot. 6°
C. Genocide as a Crime Under Customary InternationalLaw
A vast majority of nations now consider genocide a crime under
customary international law. 6 1 The United States, being a party to the
59 Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 54, at 916. See generally supra note 30.
60 See generally Matza, His Brother's Keeper, 11 STUDENT LAWYER 23-35 (1983); RICHARD
FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 43 (1981); FRANCOIS PONCHAUD, CAMBODIA

YEAR ZERO (1978); J. BARRON & A. PAUL, MURDER IN A GENTLE LAND (1977); Indochina:
Hearings before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). It has been suggested that only ravages inflicted
upon religious or ethnic groups in Cambodia may be classified as involving genocide, as defined in
the Convention. Edwards, Contributionsof the Genocide Convention to the Development of International Law, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 300, 302 (1981). If this characterization is correct, the argument
for the inclusion of a "political category" becomes even more persuasive.
61 An argument can also be made that genocide has the status ofjus cogens; that is, as a rule or
peremptory norm of international law "that states cannot derogate from even by treaty." Edwards,
supra note 59, at 305. L. Alexidze, a Russian jurist, proposes that if all three worlds (East, West,
and Third) accept legal norms from which no derogation is allowed, then a peremptory norm is
created. See Alexidze, Problems of Jus Cogens in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 1969 Sov. INT'L
L.J. 145-49. Subsequent United Nations conventions include clauses prohibiting any derogation

from the terms of the Genocide Convention. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:117

Nuremburg Tribunal 62 and an original signatory of the United Nations
Charter, 63 initially helped to promote the idea that the crime of genocide
should be globally condemned and punished. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 64 and subsequent United Nations' resolutions 65 also
sustain the belief that genocide should be universally outlawed. In addition, the International Court of Justice noted in an Advisory Decision on
May 28, 1951, that universal condemnation of genocide warranted that
the principles of the Convention, including the principle that genocide is
an international crime, were "obligatory on all nations."' 66 Consequently, the recognition of genocide as a crime under customary international law is emerging as a fundamental norm.
The status afforded customary international law in our domestic
courts was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the famous case of The
Paquete Habana.67 In Paquete Habana, fishing vessels belonging to Cuban nationals were captured by armed vessels of the United States and
sold as prizes of war. The Court held that the vessels were exempt from
capture because of their protected status under customary international
law. They reasoned that "Where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GAOR XXI, Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) article 6 at 52-58. In addition, the
United Nations International Law Commission, while drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39127, repeatedly characterized genocide as an
example of a crime possessing the status of jus cogens, and they were also of ". . . the view that a
treaty contemplating or conniving at the commission of genocide would violate jus cogens." Commentary of Art. 53 (draft Art. 50) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Report of the
International Law Commission (1966), 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 247-49, reprinted in United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference 287 (U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/11/Add.2 (1971); 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969).
62 Judgement of the International Military Tribunal, 22 Trial of the Major War CriminalsBefore
the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Proceedings 411 (1948).
63 The United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
- G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). Some commentators have expressed the
belief that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an "authoritative statement of the international community," E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 'INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70
(1964); and possibly even "a part of binding customary international law." Nayer, Human Rights:
The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 813, 816-17 (1978).
65See, e.g., The Genocide Convention, supra note 1. In addition, the Sixth Legal Committee of
the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution affirming the crime of genocide as a principle of
international law. See Onuf, LAWMAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 46 (1982). See generally,
JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 191-193 (1969).
66 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention (1951) I.C.J. 15, at 23. In
1950, the United Nations General Assembly asked the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the effect
of reservations on the Convention. See G.A. Res. 478, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 74, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/1.125 (1950). See also Bishop, Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 45 A.J.I.L.
579 (1951).
67 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See also U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 160-61 (1820); The Nereid
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).

1985]

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

customs and usages of civilized nations." 68
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
applied the Paquete Habana doctrine in the case of Filartigav. PenaIrala.69 In Filartiga, the sister of Joelito Filartiga brought an action
against the police commissioner of Ascuncion, Paraquay, for the death
by torture perpetrated against her 17-year-old brother in Paraquay. The
Court held that the Alien Tort Statute authorizes federal jurisdiction
over human rights violations occurring outside the United States under
the theory that "torture. . . violated universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights."' 70 As the Second Circuit opinion so
aptly phrased its holding in the Filartigadecision, "Indeed, for purposes
of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader
'7
before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." '
Similarly, acts of genocide, which are even more universally condemned than acts of torture, could be a basis for jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute.7 2 Thus, as genocide is arguably a violation of customary international law, as are acts of torture, a victim of genocide may
be entitled to bring a private cause of action in federal court under the
Alien Tort Statute. This status affords additional justification for treating genocide as a proper issue of executive concern under the treaty-mak73
ing standard established in Geofrey v. Riggs.
D. Self-Executing or Non-Self-Executing
Opponents to ratification insist that the Convention is a self-executing document, 74 which obligates the United States to implement enabling
68 Id.

at 700.

69 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
70 Id. The Court refers to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
71 Supra note 69, at 890. Recently, the Court awarded punitive damages to the plaintiff, Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. N.Y. 1984). A very recent unpublished District Court
decision expanded the Filartigaprinciple to include tortious acts committed by a government. In
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx), the Court held Argentina
liable under the Alien Tort Statute for injuries suffered by one of its nationals while in Argentina.
See Argentina Held Liable for Torture, The National Law Journal, Oct. 29, 1984 at 11. Col. 1.
72 The plaintiff in this case bases his cause of action on the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350--originally the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 67, 77 (1789). See Blum &
Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act after Filartigav. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 56 (1981), where the authors list other
human rights violations which have become so widely recognized as to constitute "core" violations
of international law; including piracy, slavery, genocide, summary court martial, and torture. See
also Comment, Torture as a Violation of InternationalLaw ProvidingFederalJurisdiction: Filartiga
v. Pena-Iralaand the Alien Tort Statute, 2 ANTIOCH L. J. 159 (1982).
73 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
74 Raymond, supra note 3, at 303. ("Thus, directly or indirectly, ratification would make law for
this country.") See generally Gordon, InternationalLaw-Self-Executing Treaties-The Genocide
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legislation; but this is a nonsequitur. The Convention is non-self-executing because of the requirement to implement legislation. Under the Convention countries are afforded full discretion ".

.

. in accordance with

their respective constitutions" to enact enabling legislation.7 5 In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May, 1971, included a
restrictive declaration in its report favoring ratification. The declaration
stated that the "U.S. Government declares that it will not deposit its
instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation referred
to in Article V has been enacted."'7 6 Thus, the contention that the
United States would be forced into unwanted legislation is unfounded.
This conclusion is supported by a test established in Sei Fufii v.
State,77 which determines whether a treaty is a self-executing agreement:
"First, the language of the treaty must manifest that the parties intend to
confer rights or obligations on the citizenry of the compacting nations.
Second, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution." '7 8 Conversely, a standard for recognizing non-self-executing instruments was enunciated by Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Foster v. Neilson :79 "When the terms of the
(treaty) import a contract-when either of the parties have engaged to
perform a particular act-the treaty addresses itself to the political, not
the judicial department; and the legislature0 must execute the contract
8
before it can become a rule for the Court."
In examining the express terms of the Convention, there appears to
be no contractual obligation which confers any rights on the citizenry of
a contracting state. Further, the Convention implicitly addresses itself to
the legislative,*rather than the judicial organs of the state, and Article V
of the Convention expressly requires enabling legislation. 81 In addition,
the aforementioned declaration of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee restricts Article V by requiring that enabling legislation be enacted
82
before the United States can deposit its instrument of ratification.
Convention. Examination of Arguments of Opponents of the Convention, 48 MICH. L. REV. 852
(1950).
73 Art. V of the Genocide Convention, see appendix. See also Gordon, supra note 74. For an
analysis of Art. V and reactions by other governments, see Robinson, supra note 1, at 74-79.
76 Bite, supra note 12, at 3. See generally Note, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683 (1975).
77 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-22, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952). The issue in this case was whether the
California Alien Land Law was discriminatory and in violation of the United Nations Charter. The
standard was recently applied in the Texas School Board case concerning state funding for alien
children, In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex., 1980).
79 Supra note 77, at 721-22.
79 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829).
sO Id. at 314 (material in brackets added).
81 Art. V of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
82 Bite, supra note 12, at 3.
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Hence, ratification by the Senate would not enact new law. The Convention, then, is a non-self-executing treaty by its terms.
E. States Rights
The determination that the Convention is non-self-executing is important when considering the argument proposed by opponents of the
Convention that the Treaty violates states rights. It is not exclusively
within the realm of the states to enact criminal legislation outlawing
murder.8 3 To the contrary, it is within the purview of both Houses of
Congress to enact enabling criminal legislation, even if in the absence of a
treaty, Congress would not have the authority to do so. The case of
Missouri v. Holland8 4 firmly establishes this power. Here, the Supreme
Court determined that an act of Congress was "necessary and proper" to
implement a non-self-executing treaty concerning the migration of birds
between Canada and the United States. The case overruled two lower
court decisions which had struck down a similar federal statute enacted
before the treaty was signed and put into effect.85 The prior federal statute was held invalid by the District Courts because it infringed on an
area of regulatory concern usually delegated to the states. The Supreme
Court countered that "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are de'8 6
clared to be so when made under the authority of the United States."
The Court deemed the subsequent exercise of executive power as valid.
Thus, the powers of the state, as protected by the tenth amendment, have
a limited influence on the exercise of the treaty-making power of the federal government.8 7 The only real limitation on the treaty-making power
is that the terms of any proposed treaty must not be in direct violation
with the Constitution. 8
F. FirstAmendment Rights
Article V of the Convention requires that enabling legislation be en83 U.S. CONST., Amendment X. Senator Erwin argued that Congress does not have the right to
prohibit murder and, as a result, ratification of the Convention would be an unconstitutional expansion of Congressional power. See GENOCIDE HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 197-199.
84 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
95 U.S. v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1917); U.S. v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark.
1914).
86 Supra note 84, at 430-31.
87 U.S. CONST., Art. I § 8. See also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding a
treaty with Japan superior to a city ordinance); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (holding
a convention with Italy and a treaty with Persia superior to the escheat law of New York); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 Dall 199 (1796) (holding a treaty with Great Britain superior to a Virginia statute).
8 Cherokee Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 21 L. Ed. 227 (1870). See also Henkin,
supra note 45, at 137.
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acted before the Convention can be considered binding national law. 89
Opponents of the Convention claim that the "incitement clause" in Article 11190 would cause the Congress to violate first amendment restrictions
of free speech. 9 ' These restrictions could result in the outlawing of
groups which disseminate information violating the Convention, such as
the Klu Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party. This concern was
articulated by Alfred Schweppe in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Genocide in 1950: "The insertion (in
the treaty) of 'incitement to commit genocide' . . . was a plain infringement of freedom of speech and freedom of the Press."'92 This concern
was also shared by the United States delegation to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Social and Economic Council, which was entrusted by the
United Nations to draft the Convention. The United States delegation
vehemently opposed a Russian and Polish proposal to "make punishable
propoganda aimed at instigating racial, national, or religious hatred; that
preparatory acts leading toward genocide, such as, for example, study
and research, should be punishable, and that parties to the Convention
should pledge themselves to disband organizations which aim at instigating racial, national, or religious hatred."'93 The United States delegation
eventually compromised on the present language, but even that conces94
sion bothered them.
Mr. Schweppe's argument that the Convention violates first amendment rights was refuted by Philip Perlman during the same subcommittee hearings. Mr. Perlman stressed that the "incitement" clause would
be subject to first amendment guarantees, as provided for in Article V of
the Convention, 9 5 which requires that all proposed enabling legislation
would have to be in accordance with the signatory nations' respective
constitutional norms. 96 In the United States, any alleged "incitement"
would only be punishable when it would be "shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."' 97 This point was officially
confirmed twenty years later by then Assistant Attorney General Wil89 Art. V of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
90 Art. III(c) of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.

91 Bite, supra note 12, at 2.
92 Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 54, at 930. See generally supra note 30.
93 Summary Records of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide to the Economic and
Social Counsil (1947-48) 2 Y.B.U.N. 598, U.N. Doc E/794 sales no. 1949.1.13. See also Note, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1145 (1949).

94 Id.
95 Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 54, 925-26; supra note 30.

% Art. V of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
97 See, e.g., Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 26263 (1941).
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liam Rehnquist, when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee that he was ". . . satisfied that the Convention would not
and could not affect our free speech guarantees. The case of Brandenburg v. Ohio98 still holds." 99
The persistent concern over the constitutionality of the Convention
points out the overall tautological scheme of the opponents to ratification. If a treaty is characterized as unconstitutional often enough, the
perception of the treaty by the public will eventually mirror the erroneous characterization. The result is that a treaty proscribing universally
condemned crimes is branded as too progressive and revolutionary, and
is subsequently discarded. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this instrument professes traditional American jurisprudential values. The
crimes it prohibits are based on traditional criminal theories: conspiracy,
attempt, complicity, and solicitation. to0 Under the Convention, intent is
a prerequisite to any crime, 10 1 a notion not violating the criminal jurisprudence of the United States. In addition, the extradition provisions of
the Convention apply only to extradition treaties already in place. 102 Ultimately, it is difficult to discern a revolutionary intent or content when
examining the face of the Convention. Thus, it seems that the constitutional arguments against ratification are more ideologically than legally
motivated.
IV.

ANTI-GLOBALISM AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Political opposition to the Convention is theoretically a manifestation of three ideological doctrines: anti-globalism, neo-positivism, and
anti-Sovietism. Each of these viewpoints are represented in the Senate,
but a clear numerical division of Senators into their respective doctrinal
groups is impossible to ascertain. While one Senator may embrace a single perspective, another may embrace a combination of these viewpoints.
In any case, the proposed theoretical trichotomy holds well under analytical scrutiny.
Anti-globalism, 10 3 by far the most traditional of the ideologies, is a
doctrine steeped in Westphalian dogma.Y°4 To anti-globalists, the perpet98

395 U.S. 444 (1969). Accord Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).

99 120 Cong. Rec. S1839 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1974).

100 Art. III of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
101Art. II of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
102 Art. VII of the Genocide Convention, see appendix.
103 See generally supra note 3.
104 Treaty of Westphalia (France, Holy Roman Empire, Netherlands, Spain) Oct. 24, 1648, reprinted in A. TOYNBEE, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY, 1648-1967, Vol. 1 (1967)
at 7. General settlement terminating the Thirty-Years War. The agreement ended the power of the
Holy Roman Empire, with France emerging as the dominant European power. The Westphalian era
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uation of the autonomous nation state is all important. Consequently,
the Genocide Convention is viewed as another unfortunate step in the
dismantling of the Westphalian system. In contrast, neo-positivists o5
are sympathetic to international human rights convenants, but are wary
of the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms of the Convention.
They are, above all, interested in effective legislation, not lip service to an
unenforceable treaty. They argue that a convention offering an inferior
enforcement procedure due to the insincerity of the signatory nation
should not be ratified. Further, there would be an infringement on states'
rights, by conflicting with local law concerning criminal activity not normally in the realm of federal purview.10 6 Finally, anti-Soviets10 7 champion a balance of power argument against ratification. They view the
Convention as a mere tool for the United States to engage in political
struggle with the Soviet Union. Their realistic anti-communist philosophy is a rationalization for continued opposition to the Convention and
the treaty-making process.
is generally considered to be the beginning of the primacy of the modem day nation-state. Some
theorists still consider us to be in the Westphalian era. Other theorists recognize that the gradual
integration of the global community is transforming the world into a post-Westphalian system. See
generally Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 A.J.I.L. 20 (1948).
105 See, e.g., Oliver, The Treaty Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehicles for the Enforcement of Human Rights in the United States, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411 (1981); cf., Rusk, Personal
Reflections on International Covenants on Human Rights, 9 HoFsTRA L. REV. 515 (1981). The
traditional characterization of Austinian positivism posits that the presence of a sanction is the determinative factor in recognizing "law." However, this is a very conservative approach. Modem day
positivists accept the premise of existing law without a clearly defined sanctioning process. It would
seem that those commentators who are advocating a strict positivist approach to the Genocide Convention are really anachronistic in their analysis. Thus, the term neo-positivist rather than positivist.
In addition, my definition and use of the term neo-positivism is slightly different than that expounded by H.L.A. Hart, the jurist who initially coined the phrase. Professor Hart's doctrine revolves around the premise that international law is parallel to "municipal" law in its search for
validating rules, what Hart calls "rules of recognition." According to Hart, international law has no
validating rules, but is "law" nonetheless, for the same reasons that municipal law, absent any hierarchical validating principles, is also law. Hart explores the problem of the "source" of international
law, as well as the sanction. He hypothesizes that morality finds no place in international law, and
thus no basis in the validating process. This is where our views diverge. Today's neo-positivists
accept the validating nature of international law based on mutually accepted agreement, custom, and
morality (possibly Natural Law). The contemporary problem being addressed by neo-positivists is
not one of accepting the "source" of international law, but the "sanction." Thus, my conception of
neo-positivism deals with the practical political problem of state adherence and participation, not the
sociological problem of the validity of any law-making body or institution. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For a critical analysis of Hart's doctrine, see D'Amato, The Neo-Positivist
Conception ofInternationalLaw, 59 A.J.I.L. 321 (1965); N. ONUF, LAWMAKING IN THE GLOBAL
COMMUNITY, 10-12 (1982).
106U.S. CONST., Amendment X.
107 See generally Raymond, supra note 3.
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A.

Neo-Positivism

Neo-positivist commentators express serious reservations concerning the effectiveness of the Convention. 10 8 Generally, they believe in the
concept of multilateral human rights agreements, but are tempered by
their understanding of human rights enforcement in the "real" world.
Dean Rusk can be classified as a neo-positivist, despite his support for
ratification of the Convention. He points out how international convenants on human rights are "undermined by skepticism and cynicism
about lip service that is not translated into practice.' 1°9 In essence, neopositivists accept the inherent weakness in the positivist approach to international agreements. If a nation-state is the absolute sovereign power
under international law, than a nation-state may destroy its obligations
under an existing treaty just as easily as it would create those
obligations. "10
Some commentators have questioned the neo-positivist pessimism
concerning the sincerity of other nations. Ambassador Phillip Jessup
suggests that:
Some are discouraged by the prospect that treaties will be broken
or ignored. Unfortunately they will be. Man is still so imperfect
that broken treaties, like broken contracts, are among the common
phenomena of life. Life goes on because civilization has advanced
far enough to provide a legion of law-abiding, promise-respecting
states and individuals. We belong to that legion. We shall continue to make treaties and to respect them because we believe in
law and not in anarchy. I see no reason to lapse into either barbarism or defeatism because there are still barbarians at large.'
There is also a perception among neo-positivists that presently there
is more of a global consensus in favor of implementing a global criminal
system dealing with transnational crimes, such as terrorism," 2 hijacking, 13 and kidnapping, 114 than implementing a global human rights
108 Oliver, supra note 105, at 414-16.

109Rusk, supra note 105, at 519. Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, opposed the administration's attempt to gain Senate consent to
ratification of the Convention because he believed the Soviet Union and other Eastern European
states did not take the Convention seriously in view of their reservations nullifying the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article IX. Treaties and Executive Arguments: Hearings on S.J. Res.
1 and S.J. Res. 43. Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83rd Cong. 1st
Sess. 886 (1953). See also 28 DEPT. STATE BULL. 591, 592.
110 See FALK, D'AMATO & WESTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 231-32
(1980).
111Perlman, supra note 4, at 5. (Philip Perlman quoting Ambassador Philip C. Jessup).
112See, e.g., European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976. Europ T.S.
90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
113See, e.g., Id.
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regime. Because of the lack of global consensus, the neo-positivists argue
that human rights enforcement is too nebulous to satisfy the treaty-making standard established in Geofry v. Riggs.'1i Yet, a distinction must be
made between criticism concerning the ineffectiveness of the Convention,
and an argument emphasizing a more acceptable area of the law which
would lead toward an all encompassing global legal system. It does not
follow that the common transnational interest in human rights is inadequate for a viable attempt at global codification. Neo-positivist skepticism may be unmindful of the progress made since World War II in
effectuating human rights conventions. A prime example of this progress
is the compulsary jurisdiction provision of the European Convention of
Human Rights.' "

6

I would also include within the rubric of neo-positivism those commentators, for the most part litigating attorneys and law professors, who
are skeptical about the effect that international human rights agreements
and precedent-setting cases like Filartigawill have on human rights litigation in our domestic court system. While focusing mainly on Filartiga,
but also impliedly including other human rights agreements, these commentators point out the limits of these new "tools" of litigation. The
areas of greatest concern generally include the efficacy of using the Alien
Tort Statute, and the attendant problems of the application of the Forum
Non Conveniens doctrine, conflict of law doctrine, sovereign immunity,
and other general jurisdictional questions. While these objections are domestic in nature, they support the general neo-positivist position that acts
of genocide are generally non-cognizable both in international and domestic forums.' ' 7 I doubt, however, that many Senators are fully aware
of this ongoing legal debate, and even if they are aware, it would probably have only a limited effect on their position.
B. Anti-Globalism
Anti-globalists, in general, espouse the paramount nature of the
Constitution. But in the case of the Genocide Convention their constitutional arguments against ratification are merely tools to support their
114 See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N.G.A. Res. 34/14b
(XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 00) 00 Dec. 17, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/0000 (1980), reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
is 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
116 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. This Convention establishes a regional enforcement mechanism for
upholding humanitarian law through the European Court of Human Rights. See Article 48.
117See, e.g., Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary
InternationalLaw of Human Rights in United States Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 59 (1981); Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform ConstitutionalInterpretation,4 Hous. J. INT'L.
L. 39 (1981).
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overall objective of guaranteeing that there will never be a supreme
global legal system. Their real concern echoes traditional fears that the
Convention is pro-globalist in nature, not unconstitutional in form. In
effect though, the anti-globalists are just overzealous global Federalists.
The basic ideological impulse behind their argument is the protection of
sovereignty. Senator John McClellon expressed this fear best when he
stated on the floor of the Senate that "the proposed treaty commits a
surrender of sovereignty over vital internal affairs of our country to other
nations and international tribunals." 11 8
On a more philosophical level, anti-globalists also reflect the basic
Western approach to the problem of delineating sources of international
law. While accepting treaties as evidence of customary law, i.e., examples of state practice, many Western analysts treat the move toward a
human rights regime as expounding a new source of international law.
Western culture, as well as Western lawyers, will not readily accept such
a new source of law. 119 This helps explain some of the opposition to the
Convention from Senators who are ostensibly human-rights oriented.
The fear of a fundamental shift in the global power structure
prompts many anti-globalist opponents of the Convention to publicly decry globalism as a destabilizing alternative to the present day nationalistic status quo. This partisan philosophy was expounded in a 1950 article
by George Finch, one of the Convention's more prominent opponents.
Mr. Finch argued that there was no international legal institution in
existence which could take custody of offenders. He also questioned the
wisdom of creating a "world government":
What will be the dividing line between the jurisdiction and judicial
powers of the World Government and the several states? Is it as
simple a problem as that of the United States, which required a
civil war and repeated judicial decisions to determine? We should
pause in contemplation of the risk of seeking to establish any
world government now. We must deal with the world we have
and the tools we have. Such an agreement cannot be had at this
120
time or within the predictable future.
This overt fear of global integration reached its height in the Cold
War years of the early 1950s. Senator Joseph McCarthy, an avowed
anti-globalist, consistently criticized the alleged revolutionary tone of
many of the post World War II human rights treaties.' 2' A number of
118 Supra note 99.
119 See Onuf, supra note 65, at 27.
120 Finch, supra note 2, at 736-37 (quoting George Finch quoting Ambassador Warren R. Austin,
former Chief of the United States Mission to the United Nations). Ambassador Austin's speech was
an address at Lenox, Mass., Aug. 12, 1949. XXI DEPT. STATE. BULL. 283 (Aug. 29, 1949).
'2' Bite, supra note 12, at 2.
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Senators, including McCarthy and Everett Dirksen, proposed a series of
amendments between 1948 and 1953, which would have drastically limited the power of the Executive, with Senatorial consent, to enter into
122 The Bricker Amendments 123
self-executing international agreements.
proposed to amend the Supremacy Clause 124 and to eliminate the careful
differentiation ".

.

. between 'treaties made under the authority of the

United States' and federal legislation made 'in pursuance' of the Constitution.1 25" This amendment would have effectively outlawed self-executed treaties signed by the Executive and passed on to the Senate for
advice and consent. All treaties signed by the Executive would then be
non-self-executing by constitutional mandate and could not be binding
until implementing legislation had been enacted by both Houses of Congress. As Senator Bricker stated, "The American people resent the argument that rights which they regard as God-given and inalienable can be
alienated by the President and two-thirds of the Senate present and
voting."1

26

On the surface, those supporting the Bricker Amendment advocated
a "pro-democratic" change in the treaty-making process, but possibly
underlying this altruistic motive was latent racism or at least a fear of
racial backlash in the country. The Convention was perceived by some
opponents as defining genocide so broadly that the killing of one individual may constitute genocide. While some suggested that this definition
meant the United States could be held liable for genocide against Native
Americans, a greater concern was past treatment of Blacks and other
minorities. Questions were raised about the possibility of the lynching of
Blacks as justifiable acts of genocide. Others were concerned about antagonizing the Black community and lending support to civil unrest.
122Oliver, supra note 105, at 414-16.

123Id. at 414. The amendment was named after its sponsor, the late Senator John Bricker. See
generally Bricker, Safeguarding the Treaty Power, 13 FED. B.J. 77 (1953). The proposed amendment
was introduced as S.J. Res. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 160 (1953).
124 U.S. CONST., Art. VI § 2. See D. Tanenbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: The
Interaction between Domestic and ForeignAffairs (1980) (dissertation on file in Columbia University
library). For an excellent summary of the positions of all the participants in the Bricker debate, see
Paige, supra note 52, at 125-152.
125 Oliver, supra note 105, at 415.
126 Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 952. See also The Bricker Amendment, 1953: Hearings
on S.J. Res. I and 43 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., at 1-12, 823-27 (1953). Ironically, the debates within the 1787 Constitutional Convention
illustrate the founding fathers opposition to mandatory non-self-executing treaties. Gouverneur
Morris proposed an addition to the Treaty-making clause which would mandate that ". . . no treaty
shall be binding on the United States which is not ratified by law." Edmund Randolph, the governor
of Virginia, pointed out that almost every speaker was in opposition to the proposal. The matter was
tabled for further study. CHARLES TANSILL (ed.), DOCUMENTS: FORMATION OF THE UNION OF

AMERICAN STATES 606-607 (1927).
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Senator Walter George opposed ratification because he feared the pact
might bring anti-lynching legislation within the realm of federal authority. 127 All of these objections were raised in an atmosphere of civil uncertainty and general antagonism toward Blacks, especially among southern
Senators.
Racial undertones were also evident in the Foreign Affairs Committee's treatment of probably the most important proponent of the Convention, Raphael Lemkin. Some members of the Committee stated they
were upset with his pushy attitude, but one candid member admitted that
he thought it was a very bad idea that the most important spokesman for
the Convention should be ". . . a man who comes from a foreign country who . . . speaks broken English." 128 The Senator also felt that

Lemkin, being a Jew, should not be the one propagandizing the Convention. Ultimately, he admitted that Lemkin's foreignness, and perhaps
Jewishness, were factors which worked against ratification in those early
years. 129
The Bricker amendments were never adopted, but the "Brickerites"
may have, to an extent, accomplished their objective of scuttling ratification of international human rights agreements. The Eisenhower Administration decided not to support ratification of the Convention or any
human rights agreements, because it feared ".

.

. that any attempt to

ratify the Convention might tip the Congressional balance in favor of
passing Bricker's proposal."' 130 The Kennedy Administration changed
this policy only slightly, sending three minor human rights treaties to the
Senate for ratification. This Executive indifference ended with the Nixon
Administration, but the twenty-year hiatus may have permanently crippled any chance for Senate ratification of the Convention.13 '
The ostensible reason for this constitutional initiative to outlaw selfexecuted treaties was to curtail the "effort to eliminate racially based discrimination by use of the treaty power," 1 32 as was unsuccessfully attempted in the Sei Fujii case.' 33 Even so, the anti-globalist sentiment
inherent in the Bricker Amendment supports the contention that in the
early 1950's the Convention fell victim to a growing fear of global integration, rather than a legitimate concern for constitutional purity. Un127 JOHN ROURKE, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY

IN

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICYMAKING 242

(1982).
121

LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Under-

standing, 78 A.J.I.L. 377-378 (April, 1984).
129

Id.

Supra note 127, at 243.
Henkin, supra note 45, at 394, n.71.
132 Oliver, supra note 10, at 414.
133 SeiFujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d. 718, 242 P.2d 617 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1952).
130

131
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questionably, the opponents of the Convention would have been more
than willing to change the Constitution to suit their partisan philosophy.
C. Anti-Sovietism
Anti-Soviet opponents of the Convention base their argument on the
belief in the inevitability of a geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union
and its vassal states.1 34 But their essential fear is the same as that of the
anti-globalists: a surrender of sovereignty to potential enemies of the
United States. The anti-Soviets are not isolationists. 135 Rather, they are
geo-political ideologues, ready to confront the forces of communism
wherever and however they can. While finding allies in the anti-globalists, especially the southern Senators and neo-positivists, they distinguish
themselves from these doctrinal groups by attacking the Soviet Union's
integrity as a representative government, and its sincerity as a signatory
to the Convention. Anti-Soviets argue that as a result of this duplicitous
Soviet policy, the United States has been tricked into signing a clearly
1 36
pro-Soviet instrument.
This fear concerning Soviet intentions and effects becomes evident
when examining the different interpretations of the drafting of the Convention, especially pertaining to the omission of "political" groups as a
category under Article II. It was asserted by opponents of the Convention that during the drafting sessions the United States supported the
inclusion of a "political" category in Article II, but relented to Soviet
pressure to omit the clause. They claim that the Soviet Union reserved
for itself the luxury of classifying any state-inspired murder as a political
act, thus bypassing the provisions of the Convention.137 Because of this
omission, the Convention could not prevent genocide where it would actually be occurring, i.e., in Eastern Europe. They felt that the Conven1 38
tion was a windfall for Soviet influence and prestige.
While there is some truth in this characterization of Soviet intent, a
clear reading of the overall aims and desires of all the countries and parties involved in the drafting sessions leads one to a contrary conclusion
concerning the effect of the Soviet Union's position on the Convention's
implementation. The World Jewish Congress was the first group to call
for the exclusion of "political" groups as a category in Article II. The
134 Bite, supra note 12, at 2.
135 Isolationists believe in a curtailed U.S. foreign policy.
136 Phillips & Deutsch, supra note 3, at 643.
137 See Kuper, supra note 7, P't 24-30. But one must remember that Mr. Kuper is a great advo-

cate for the inclusion of a "political" category. His antagonistic reaction toward the Soviet position
may be more of a result of emotion than objective observation.
138 Sohn & Beurgenthal, supra notes 54, at 929; Raymond, supra note 3, at 295; Phillips &
Deutsch, supra note 3, at 643.
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official explanation given by the World Jewish Congress was that "The
recommendation was made to obviate the delay in acceptance which
might have been occasioned by differences of opinion as to what constitutes a 'political' group."' 3 9 Eventually many countries objected to the
inclusion of a "political" category. Venezuela and Brazil, as well as the
Soviet Union, raised initial objections to its inclusion.'4° Further, a proposal drafted by Egypt, Iran, and Uraquay officially deleted the category
of "political" groups. 14 1 The publicized reason for this bipartisan opposition was that "political" groups would be too hard to define in a domestic context. 142 More likely, many countries anticipated the possibility of
violent political confrontation within their own broders. 43 Nevertheless,
critics of the Convention continued to point to Soviet treachery.
The political and military confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union in the early.1950s reflected the acrimonious atmosphere surrounding the dialogue between the two countries pertaining to
the drafting and implementation of the Convention. Both countries continually refused to acknowledge the possibility of genocide occurring
within their own borders. In fact, this nationalistic self-righteousness
became evident in the acknowledgements of most countries concerning
their role in implementing and enforcing the Convention. 44 As Raul
Hilburg observes in his classic study of the Holocaust, The Destruction of
145
the European Jews,
If there is any implication, it is rather the propensity of each state
to accuse some other signatory of that possibility. Such was the
attempt of the United States to insert a provision against the destruction of 'economic' groups', 146 and the attempted inclusion by
139 Note, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1145 (1949). See also

Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention:
Communications from Non-government Organizations, ESCOR Doc. E/623 51 (Jan. 30, 1948).
140Summary Records of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide to the Economic and
Social Counsel (1947-48), 2 Y.B.U.N. 598, U.N. Doc. E/794 Sales No. 1949.1.13.

141Excerpts of the Summary Records of the 187th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (1948-49), 3 Y.B.U.N. 954, sales no. 1950 11.
142 Some commentators do not even mention the controversy over the Soviet Union's actions in
opposing the inclusion of a "political" category. See Robinson, supranote 1, at 59; Frost, supra note

1, at 60-63.
143 It has been suggested that the intrinsic nature of genocide is inextricably bound up with the
power and nature of the state. Thus, the real test of national integrity would be to accept this
restriction on state political power. See generally Kuper, supra note 7; Horowitz, supra note 7.

Unfortunately, this was not to be. The Ad Hoc Committee in charge of drafting the Convention
eventually voted to delete the category by a vote of 22 in favor of deletion, 6 against, and 12 abstraining. Robinson, supra note 1, at 62.
144Some states have not even enacted enabling legislation because they feel existing legislation is

more than enough to satisfy the purpose of the Convention. Robinson, supra note 1, at 32.
145 RAUL HILBURG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961).

146U.S. amendment of October 4, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/215.
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the U.S.S.R. of a declaration in the preamble that 'genocide is organically bound up with fascism-nazism, and other similar race
theories.'1 47 In the end, the United States did not ratify the Convention, and the Soviets accepted it only with the reservation that
they would not be answerable to the International Court of
Justice. 148
Private groups were also very much involved in this anti-Soviet posturing. The American Bar Association, in particular, seemed "preoccupied" with anti-Soviet arguments. 49 This point may help explain why
initially the American Bar Association was such an outspoken critic of
the Convention. When the ABA finally reversed its position on the Convention in 1976, the main group to take its place as the chief opposition
spokesman was the Liberty Lobby, a self-avowed anti-communist organization. In 1981, at the Senate hearings on the Convention, the Liberty
Lobby sharply criticized the ABA for reversing its position on the Convention. 150 Inevitably, this psychological factor of mutual nationalistic
distrust greatly undermined the Convention's chances for ratification.
Anti-globalist and anti-Soviet opponents to ratification consciously
and consistently overstate their constitutional arguments to balance out
what they perceive to be a dangerous naivete on the part of the Treaty's
proponents. The overall debate has become one of ideological substance,
not constitutional form. Consequently, one can conclude that it was the
global antagonism between the two superpowers, coupled with antiglobalist sentiment and neo-positivist skepticism, that prompted the victory against ratification.
CONCLUSION

"The incorrigible legalism of the lawyer,"' 51 wrote Pitman Potter,
remains the main obstacle to the acceptance of the primacy of global
legal integration. "The orthodox International Law advocate loses immeasurably in his effort to improve matters international by adhering to
the older type of law and neglecting the new."' 52 This "new" international law is the essense of any solution to the problem of genocide. The
Genocide Convention will remain unratified, and probably unenforce147 Soviet amendment of November 18, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/273.

148Hilburg, supra note 145, at 764.
149Supra note 128, at 574.
150 Id. n.18.

151Potter, Obstacles and Alternatives to InternationalLaw, 53 A.J.I.L. 647, 649 (1959). Pitman
Potter was an original architect of the League of Nations and an advisor to President Woodrow
Wilson.
152Id. at 649. See generally Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1982).

1985]

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

able, until the international lawyer accepts the role of being an advocate
for global integration, or at least an advocate for a viable human rights
regime,1 53 and not a guardian of national sovereignty. By analogy, today's anti-globalists are not very different from the power brokers of the
Holy Roman Empire, who realized that the Treaty of Westphalia 154 was
the death knell for divine governance and the birth of national sovereignty. Many fought bitterly against this anti-Christian leap of faith.
But clearly their ideas were notions of a bygone era.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the Genocide Convention is a result of an ideological and political coalition of anti-globalist, anti-Soviet,
and neo-positivist Senators. This coalition has been powerful enough to
prevent a two-thirds Senate majority from ratifying the Convention. Despite Executive support for the Convention, official ABA approval of the
Convention, and private-sector arguments in favor of the Convention,1 55
the opponents to ratification continue to cling to their ideological interpretation of the Convention's effects.
Quite recently, the Reagan Administration, acting ideologically but
not politically out of character, sent the Convention back to the Senate
for advice and consent. The Senate, threatened with filibusters by conservative Senators, again shelved the Convention. 156 But the President
and his conservative allies on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
in particular Senators Richard Lugar and Jesse Helms, responded to the
defeat by proposing the addition of two reservations and three understandings to the Convention, which would severely limit the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice in cases involving the United
States.1 -57 Ostensibly, the new limiting reservations would allow con153 See Onuf, supra 65, at 74-81. Professor Onuf suggests that codification of "networks of reciprocity," or commonly, international human rights regime, may lead us to more trouble than less
trouble.
154 Supra note 104.
155 See, e.g., THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE: A PLEA FOR RATIFICATION OF THE GENOCIDE PACT,

The Serbian National Defense Council of America (1951).
156Washington Post, October 11, 1984, at A4, Col. 1. See generally, Genocide Convention Ratification: Hearings on Executive 0., the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. Before the Full Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 12,
1984).
157 The Lugar/Helms provisos:

I.

The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations:
(1) That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which
the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required
in each case.
(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action
by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States.
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servative opponents to the Convention to now vote in favor of
ratification.
On May 22, 1985, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to
send the Convention to the Senate with the new reservations. 158 The
Senate plans to vote on the new treaty package sometime in the summer.
For the first time in thirty-six years, the Convention has a fairly good
chance of passing the Senate.
Whether the Convention is defeated or approved with the limiting
reservations, the Senate has again shown its traditional anti-globalist
bias. In essence, the Brickerites live. The Helms-Lugar provisions address the same constitutional objections raised twenty-five years earlier
by proponents of the Bricker amendments and opponents of the Genocide Convention. By gutting the Convention of any compulsory jurisdictional clout and interpretive powers, the conservatives in the Senate have
achieved their objective: the defeat of a treaty which might foster the
implementation of a unified global legal system.
II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following understandings, which shall apply to
the obligations of the United States under this Convention:
(1) That nothing in Article VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its
own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.
(2) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent
required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this
Convention.
(3) That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in Article VI
of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its
participation in any such tribunal by a treaty entered into specificially for that purpose
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., Business Meeting of May 21, 1985 (to
accompany Ex. 0., 81st Cong., 1st Sess.). See also STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE. Ratified in San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United
States, Oct. 24, 1945. Art. 36. 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Benans 1153,1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052.
118 Washington Post, May 22, 1985, at AS, Col. 1. The Committee vote was 10 to 0. Nine
Republicans and one Democrat voted in favor. Eight Democrats who opposed the limitations voted
present.

